The effects of grievant value, politics and the seriousness of the offense on discipline severity

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to determine the similarities between models of due process developed in the industrial relations and organizational behavior/psychology literatures in order to develop a framework of due process for discipline. The authors obtained special access to a historical (1949-1958) Ford Motor employee data set (1,080 grievances involving 334 employees) thru Wayne State University’s Walter P. Reuther library’s special collections in labor archives. An empirical test on this data set was conducted assessing the impact of several factors on the severity of discipline. The propositions containing these factors include that the prior discipline record of a grievant affects the severity of the current discipline; that the more skilled the grievant, the less severe the discipline; that the more senior the grievant, the less severe the discipline; and that union politics affect discipline and discharge grievance outcomes. The findings support all the propositions save that concerning seniority due mainly to a lack of seniority data.

Keywords: grievances, union politics, discipline.
INTRODUCTION

There has been renewed interest in the meaning and practice of just cause and due process. Because of recent developments concerning employment at will, the interest is becoming political and societal - Montana passed a law requiring good cause and due process for employee discharge (Tompkins, 1988) and other states have legislation pending (Fandt, Labig, & Urich, 1990), and the Federal Government is studying a revised code of employment rights. The purpose of this article is to show that the industrial relations and organizational behavior/psychology literatures have independently developed very similar frameworks of what constitutes just cause and due process. Behavior in the discipline process is examined using a combined framework. This study empirically examines the factors that affect the severity of the initial penalty fashioned by management in a disciplinary instance, and the consistency of their application, testing a small part of the theory of fair treatment and due process as it applies to a unionized situation.

The data used for this test are appropriate because they represent (arbitral) precedent setting examples of discipline and discharge. Peterson and Lewin (1990) point out that companies developing nonunion grievance systems draw heavily upon this precedent in developing procedures providing due process. Meyer and Cooke (1988), Klaas (1989a), and Klaas and Wheeler (1990) show that parties closely, but not exactly, follow arbitral precedent in resolving grievances.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are two streams of literature that are drawn upon to provide the theoretical framework for this study: industrial relations and organizational behavior/psychology. Both examine the use of discipline and punishment and their impact on behavioral change (reform) from different perspectives. Further, each literature develops a similar notion of due process and just cause. It will be shown that both literatures conclude that fair treatment (due process, equity, procedural justice, or interactional justice) is achieved if the process is reasonable, consistent, accurate, ethical, and provides for prior knowledge, voice, correctability, and representation. The literature review will examine first the concept of due process then how discipline is determined from each perspective.

Industrial Relations

In the industrial relations literature just cause (the reason for management action) and due process (the validation of management action) are both required for both the process and the outcome to be seen as fair. An important component of disciplinary due process is the use of either progressive or positive discipline. The literature provides a number of tests of how arbitrators interpret just cause and due process using published decisions (Cole, 2008; Jennings & Wolters, 1976; Karim & Stone, 1988; and Malinowski, 1981). Here, just cause and due process include: prior knowledge of the rule or standard (prior knowledge); consistent application of discipline for violation of the rule or standard (consistency); hearing the employee's explanation (voice/correctability); taking into account any mitigating circumstances (reasonableness/excuse); formal, thorough investigation and hearing
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(accuracy/correctability); punishment fitting the crime (reasonableness/consistency/ethicality); and consideration of the past record and length of service (value). Representation is presumed because of the union presence and its duty of fair representation. If these criteria are met, then, according to Daugherty's principles (1966), just cause and due process exist (McPherson, 1987). Markowich (1989) develops a similar set of criteria. But, as Arvey and Jones (1985) and Peterson and Lewin (1990) have pointed out, there have been no empirical tests of how employees, unions, and managers interpret and apply due process or just cause, or what factors affect due process or just cause.

In unionized settings, the process used to determine the fairness of a particular discipline is the grievance procedure. Although there has been renewed study of the grievance procedure and its operation and impact on various outcomes affecting the firm, there has been only a few empirical studies of discipline grievances and their impact and no studies studying the grievance procedure in terms of procedural justice (Greenberg, 1987). General findings are that the employee rights, economic, and political factors affect grievance outcomes (Meyer & Cooke, 1988); that an employee's work history affects grievance outcomes (Klaas, 1989a); and that there is inconsistent treatment of grievances (Klaas, 1989a; Klaas & Wheeler, 1990; and Meyer & Cooke, 1988). Regarding discipline, Fandt et al. (1990) found that the more the supervisor liked the employee the less severe the discipline, and Greer and Labig (1987) found that employees responded better to discipline when that discipline was more intense, more certain (consistency), handled pleasantly and privately (reasonableness), and was based on an accurate diagnosis (accuracy) than otherwise. Thus consistent treatment has been found to be a necessary aspect of due process but does not find its way into practice. To further examine why this might be we turn to an examination of the organizational behavior/psychology literature on procedural justice.

Organizational Behavior/Psychology

This literature provides three theoretical frameworks for the process examined here: equity (Adams, 1965; Greenberg, 1988); procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1989) or organizational justice (Greenberg, 1987, 1990); and interactional justice (Bies, 1987; Bies & Moag, 1986). As both procedural and interactional justice evolved from equity theory, the following discussion will focus on justice. Although procedural justice is described very differently by the various authors, its components are described very simply. Leventhal argues that procedural justice and fairness result from consistency, absence of bias, factual accuracy, voice/correctability, representation, and ethicality (Spera, 1992). In his review of this literature, Greenberg (1987) found that the research in this area confirms much of this framework. Sheppard and Lewicki (1987) found that consistency, bias suppression, correctability, and ethicality were identified as components of procedural justice; Greenberg (1986) found that consistency, voice/correctability, and accuracy were components of procedural fairness; Fry's work (Fry & Cheney, 1981; Fry & Leventhal, 1979) and Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) have found that "consistency was a powerful determinant of perceived fairness across a wide variety of situations and social relationships" (Greenberg, 1987, p. 15). The factors accuracy,
consistency, voice, and correctability match those from the industrial relations literature. If reasonableness encompasses bias suppression, only the factors (from industrial relations) prior knowledge, representation, and employee value are not found in the procedural justice literature.

In the work to date, consistency is the factor that has been regularly found to be an aspect of procedural justice. This is consistent with the industrial relations literature. However, the work by Bies (1987; Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1988) on interactional justice would lead to the conclusion that inconsistent treatment can be seen as fair if the mitigating circumstances, apologies, and excuses (causal accounts) are perceived as reasonable. Thus, in practice, there may be a trade-off between consistency and reasonableness. Inconsistent treatment, such as found in the industrial relations literature, may be acceptable if the causal account is reasonable. As a test to see which of these theories better applies, this study will examine the severity of management discipline in a grievance procedure setting to see if severity is applied consistently, controlling for the value of the grievant and the discipline situation.

Turning to the industrial relations literature, discipline in industrial work settings has received a tremendous amount of study over the years. After World War II, initial interest was in describing the changes brought on by the rapid unionization of the U.S. workforce during the 1930s and furthered by the War Labor Board (Stessin, 1960). Then the developing pattern of guiding arbitral decision making was described (Elkouri, 1952; Phelps, 1959; and Slichter, Healy, & Livernash, 1960). Wheeler (1976) (as did Arvey & Jones, 1985) reviewed the literature on discipline with respect to individual behavioral change (reform) and the impact of punishment. Both studies conclude that the theory and understanding of how discipline or punishment affects individual behavioral change has not found its way into practice. It is apparent from a recent BNA study that punishment for improper behavior is still the norm. In most cases, being disciplined is still seen as being punished, not being reformed.

Although there is general agreement that it is better for all parties to reform the unacceptable behavior of employees, the authors of this literature also agree that certain employee behavior is so noxious to plant society that it should result in immediate discharge. Examples of this include theft, fighting, gross insubordination, dishonesty, drinking or possessing alcohol, and gambling. These behaviors typically lead to immediate discharge. See Stessin (1960) for a more comprehensive list.

This study tests a framework of what factors affect the severity of the disciplinary action and the consistency of their application. For the most part, this framework contains propositions that are of such long-standing nature that they seem 'common sense'. Furthermore, it is clear that many arbitrators and practitioners use these propositions to guide their decisions. Thus the theoretical development will seem short and straightforward; there is nothing new about it.

The question examined is: How is the disciplinary action fashioned? If, as implied in the research cited above, the parties find arbitral standards acceptable (or necessary) in governing their behavior, then the factors that arbitrators apply in determining case outcomes (measures of employee value) should be applied consistently by the parties themselves in addressing disciplinary situations and resolving them short of arbitration. If there is a consistent application, with little variability of the effects of these factors, the
framework of procedural justice should be used to guide future research. Otherwise, the framework of interactional justice, specifically the use of causal accounts, should be the focus of future research.

The importance of determining the factors that impact discipline grievances and the consistency of their application is underscored by the fact that unions and managements use prior grievance outcomes and what affected those outcomes to determine how they will process present grievances (Knight, 1986) and that the arbitration process is the model for changes in Federal employment rights. Also, the parties are least likely to resolve discipline (as opposed to other types of) grievances among themselves, leading to costly arbitration (Knight, 1986, p. 595; Labig, Helburn, & Rodgers, 1985, p. 44). Thus discovering the practical, applied impact of factors that affect discipline grievances may be the feedback necessary to provide just cause, due process, and avoid arbitration. Before discussing the factors that affect the application of discipline, the theory behind the design and operation of discipline systems is discussed.

THEORY, PROPOSITIONS, HYPOTHETESSES

Here, there are three parties involved in initiating and resolving discipline and discharge grievances: the grievant, the union, and management. Each has an impact on the proceedings. As management responds to employee activity by applying its rules and prerogatives in disciplining or discharging employees, this discussion will begin with management. However, the stage must be set by discussing the rules and expectations of the workplace.

Management sets up rules and expectations for workplace behavior to achieve efficiency in carrying out its objectives. Management enjoys great latitude in unilaterally establishing these rules and expectations. The limits to this are simple. If these rules lead to inefficient use of resources, the business will close. If these rules are not equitable and fair, employees will not be attracted to or be retained by the firm unless the firm pays above the going rate. Thus, these rules are constrained by needs for efficiency and equity. Efficiency is attained by supervisors or employees focusing on task orientation. Equity is attained when employees perceive that workplace justice is provided (see Arvey & Jones, 1985, p. 392). In a unionized setting these rules are negotiated and contractually binding. As each workplace has distinctly different efficiency needs, hence different rules and expectations, the following discussion will focus on the general characteristics of workplace justice.

Management values the contributions of employees, hence values employees. The more valuable the employee, the more management will attempt to reform the employee and continue to receive valuable contributions from that employee. As all employees have replacement or termination costs, all initial discipline is reformatory in nature. However, in light of the breaking of the rule or falling short of expectations, management will weigh the value of the employee's contributions against the impact on the morale of the other employees and on the ability of the supervisor to maintain orderly task orientation (O'Reilly & Puffer, 1982). As employees become less valuable (or more easily replaced or done without) or have a greater impact on reducing morale or order, management will move from
reform to punishment. This leads to the first proposition: The more valuable the employee, the less severe the discipline for a given offense.

The employee, in accepting employment, tacitly agrees to be governed by management's rules and expectations. To the extent that these rules are directly and reasonably related to attaining efficiency (reasonableness), conveyed to the employees (knowledge), and fairly and equitably applied (consistency), typical employees will have no problems in abiding by them. However, some employees will fall short of these behavioral goals. When these employees are disciplined, their sense of workplace justice may be tried. If this sense of justice is violated in a unionized situation, a grievance can result. This grievance can result from disagreement regarding (1) the facts of the matter (accuracy), (2) the reasonableness of the rule, (3) knowledge of the rule, (4) consistency of application of the rule, or (5) the punishment not fitting the crime (reasonableness). The greater the extent to which the sense of justice is violated, the more the grievant wants the grievance upheld and the discipline reversed. Generally, because discipline is viewed as punishment, it is safe to say that the grievant wants the discipline reversed.

Affecting whether this individual sense of injustice is taken up by the union for collective action is whether the collective sense of justice has been violated. The greater the perceived violation, the more the union will attempt to reverse the discipline (voice/representation). In making a decision as to what to do about a disciplinary action, the union examines the situation in light of the impact on the workforce. This sense of justice follows from the same points of disagreement discussed above. The more the workgroup is offended by the unfairness, inequity, or injustice of this particular action (see Arvey & Jones, 1985, p. 399), the more the union must intercede to reverse the discipline. This leads to wider support for the union leaders. When the discipline is just, as when a bad apple finally gets discharged, if the union takes up the grievance, it will be seen as the purveyors of injustice. Generally, the union will balance the effects (political and rights) of taking up a grievance of a disciplined employee against the effects of violating the workgroup's sense of justice. This will, in most cases, lead to the union supporting the grievance. If management intends to establish a working relationship with the union, they will take the political ramifications of an anticipated discipline into account prior to administering it. As the union leaders are sensitive to the political impact of an applied discipline, they will alter their handling of grievances given different impact. Either, or both, leads to the second proposition: The greater the political impact of a grievance, the less severe the discipline for a given offense.

As discussed above, certain types of behaviors have a more serious effect on the workplace than others. This is either because of the impact on efficiency or safety or the impact on control or morale. Thus it is proposed that when an egregious offense occurs, the severity of the discipline will be greater. This leads to the third proposition: More serious offenses will lead to more severe discipline. The implicit equation tested here is as follows: Severity is a function of Grievant Value, Political Effects, and Seriousness of the Offense.

Variable Operationalization
Management values both collective and individual aspects of employees. When production needs are above average, management has a greater need to have every employee available and working at an efficient rate, employees are more valuable. It is hypothesized that at these times management will be more lenient and remedial than at times of lower production (TPROD). Across all employees, some types of employees have a greater value due to their higher skill level than others. Management discipline of these employees will be relatively more lenient and remedial than for less skilled employees (SKILL).

Besides these job and production related factors, individual value is also determined by the prior work record of the disciplined employee. There have been mixed findings regarding the prior work or discipline record of an employee. Labig et al. (1985) and Ponak (1987) found no effect of prior performance on performance after reinstatement, but Klaas (1989a) did find an effect of prior work record on the grievance outcome. Jennings and Wolters (1976) and Malinowski (1981) found that arbitrators consider the employee's past discipline record in deciding to reinstate or not. Also, it is a commonly held notion in arbitration that more senior employees with spotless records are allowed one mistake. This is not true of more junior employees or those with a history of discipline. Thus it is hypothesized that management will be more lenient and remedial with more senior (SENIORITY) employees and with those without any prior discipline (NOPRIOR).

Further, it is hypothesized that as the discipline record of an employee becomes longer, the more severe the current discipline (NPRIORPEN). Finally, employees who have been warned verbally of the inappropriateness of their behavior are hypothesized to have more severe discipline than employees who have not been warned (VERBWARN).

SENIORITY presents problems, however. Jennings and Wolters (1976) and Ponak (1987) found no effect of seniority on arbitrator's opinions. Further, Labig et al. (1985) and Malinowski (1981) found that seniority did not affect performance after reinstatement. Although Elkouri and Elkouri (1985, p. 682) presented many cases to the contrary, and Klaas (1989a) finds an effect, SENIORITY may not affect the severity of discipline over many cases.

To judge the seriousness of the offense, the categorization used by Holly (1957), Jennings and Wolters (1976), Malinowski (1981), Phelps (1959), and Wheeler (1976) is used here. There are four main categories of discipline and subcategories within each main category for a total of fourteen subcategories. Grievances fitting nine of these subcategories are found in the data and are listed in Table 1. Grievances concerning union activity are excluded from the analysis due to the mixed-motive management may have in choosing the appropriate severity of discipline. Compared with grievances resulting from discipline for negligence in performing job duties, all other types of offenses are hypothesized as leading to more severe discipline. Although all categories of grievances are controlled for, in order to make comparisons by type, specific hypotheses are offered for the serious, egregious offenses mentioned above. These are excessive rule violations (EXCESS RULES), insubordination (INSUBORD), ALCOHOL, GAMBLING, THEFT, and GARNISHMENTS.

The effect of handling discipline grievances on the union also varies with a variety of factors (Meyer & Cooke, 1988). Prior to elections, the union officers will try to garner political support even more so than at other times. Thus, the union can be expected to use
whatever means it can to ensure less severe discipline during these times (ELEC).
Similarly, when a group is disciplined for group behavior, the union officers will do what
they can to ensure less severe discipline (GROUP).

It has been pointed out by Klaas (1989a), Klaas and Wheeler, (1990), and Meyer and
Cooke (1988) that grievance outcomes vary across time and across location, that is,
grievance outcomes are inconsistent. The year of the grievance and the plant location are
added as important controls to examine consistency.

Model Specification and Data

The explicit equation is:

\[
\text{SEVERITY} = a_1 + b_1 \text{TPROD} + b_2 \text{SKILL} + b_3 \text{SENIORITY} + b_4 \text{NOPRIOR} + b_5 \\
\text{NPRIORPEN} + b_6 \text{VERBWARN} + b_7 \text{ABSENTEEISM} + b_8 \text{NEGligence} \\
+ b_9 \text{SLEEPING} + b_{10} \text{EXCESS RULES} + b_{11} \text{INSUBORD} + b_{12} \text{ALCOHOL} \\
+ b_{13} \text{GAMBLING} + b_{14} \text{THEFT} + b_{15} \text{GARNISHMENTS} + b_{16} \text{ELEC} \\
+ b_{17} \text{GROUP} + b_{18-26} 1950-1958 + b_{27} \text{TRIM} + b_{28} \text{TRUCK} + b_{29} \text{HP} \\
+ b_{30} \text{TRACTOR}^V
\]

A number of important points concerning the specification of these variables follow.

Although SEVERITY is measured on a 1-5 ordinal scale, there were actually 57
separate penalties found in the data. Although one end, discharge (5), is a discrete, singular
measure, the other four categories have been collapsed for the sake of simplicity. All four
are Reprimand and Warnings, but the extent of time off without pay varies considerably.
Category 1 contains penalties of less than eight hours. Category 2 contains penalties of one
to five days. Category 3 contains penalties of more than one week up to two weeks.
Category 4 contains penalties of more than two weeks but short of discharge.

The collapsing of these penalties into these categories creates an imprecise dependent
variable. Other researchers may have categorized the data differently. By collapsing the
data into these five categories, only the cut points between categories are discrete. The
penalties that comprise the category are (lumpily) spread across the distance between
cutpoints. For these reasons ordered probit will be used as an estimator to account for the
unknown distance between category centers and possible overlap between categories.
Further, management is not thought to have consistently administered discipline over the
years and across the plants; hence, some imprecision in the dependent variable mirrors the
actual practice. Small differences in severity are masked by this categorization. Similar
grievances of employees with the same value would show an empirical difference only if
there are categorical differences in severity.

Because of the length of the record of previous discipline for some employees, the
1,080 discipline grievances covered only 334 employees. Of these 334, 213 had no prior
discipline, 24 had one prior discipline, etc., up to one individual with 21 prior disciplines.
Only the last discipline on record for an individual is included in this analysis.

The data are formal grievance records donated by Ford-UAW Local 400 in Highland
Park, Michigan, to the Walter P. Reuther Memorial Library archives. Because of UAW
concerns over the confidentiality of more recent records, access to records was restricted to
the 1949-1958 period. Although these data are dated, they provide a unique opportunity to
allow the first empirical tests of hypotheses central to the disciplinary due process. Because of the need to test for the prior record of the grievant, we exclude grievances from the study when there is incomplete or missing data concerning the prior discipline record. This, and the lack of seniority data in a number of cases, restricts the N of the sample for a test of the full equation to 179. Because of the lack of support in the literature for a strong hypothesis concerning SENIORITY, the equation reported is estimated excluding SENIORITY. In this equation, the N is 310.

For the above reasons, we caution the reader concerning the magnitude of the effects revealed by these tests: they should not be generalized. Although the theory is sound and is widely supported, this study can yield empirical support to hypothesized direction but not to magnitude.

Before moving to the results of the estimations, a number of aspects of these data need describing. Many of these grievances were started at an advanced level of the grievance process, as would be expected. One hundred ninety-one (57.2%) of the 334 cases were started at the third step of the procedure, the last step prior to arbitration. Twenty-nine of the 67 discharge cases were started at this step. The average time needed to resolve all cases was 33.38 days, with the discharge cases averaging 30.74 days. Overall, 70 of the 334 cases were resolved in favor of the grievant, 95 were resolved partially in favor of the grievant, and 136 were denied. The other cases were withdrawn by the union (denied). For the 67 discharge cases, 6 were resolved favorably to the grievant, 23 were resolved partially favorable, and 31 were denied. Seventeen of the 67 discharge cases were appealed to arbitration, and 8 of the 20 cases actually arbitrated were discharge cases.

Turning to the level of the process at which these grievances were resolved, 10 of 29 grievances resolved at the second level were resolved favorably to the grievant, 16 partially favorable, and 3 denied. The union almost automatically appealed all cases denied at the second level to the third level. At the third level, 48 (of 240 resolutions) were favorable, 58 were partially favorable, and 105 were denied. Of the 61 cases that were appealed to arbitration, only 20 were actually arbitrated. The results (of these 61 cases) were 12 favorable, 21 partially favorable, and 28 denied. The average time for resolution was 14.25 days for the grievances resolved at the second level, 25.32 days for the third level, 97.78 days for those appealed to arbitration but resolved prior to arbitration, and 139.16 days for those that were arbitrated. Many of those resolved prior to arbitration were resolved the day of the scheduled hearing.

RESULTS

Table 1, as indicated in the appendix, presents the ordered probit estimations of the coefficients for the equation. The results provide considerable support for the propositions and hypotheses. The results for the equation including seniority were very similar. The magnitudes of the coefficients were very close to those reported and the significance levels of the coefficients were the same. In the equation including SENIORITY, although SENIORITY obtains the correct sign, it is not significantly related to SEVERITY. This is consistent with the lack of support in the literature for significant effects of SENIORITY. Because of the age of the data and other questions concerning generalizability, the magnitudes of the coefficients will not be discussed.
Variables related to the value of individual employees as well as the workforce were significantly related to the SEVERITY of the discipline. NOPRIOR was related to a significant reduction in the SEVERITY of the discipline. When an employee had no previous record of discipline, the initial discipline was less severe. NPRIORPEN and VERBWARN were significantly related to more severe discipline. When an employee had a more lengthy record of prior discipline, the current discipline was more severe. When an employee had been warned by his supervisor, the formal discipline was more severe. SKILL obtains the opposite sign from the hypothesized direction but is not significant. TPROD obtains the opposite sign from the hypothesized direction and approaches significance. When production is at a higher level, disciplinary action is more severe. Both ELEC and GROUP, variables associated with the impact of the discipline on union political outcomes, obtained significance in the hypothesized direction. During the six-month period prior to union elections, the discipline imposed was less severe. When the discipline was the group in nature, as opposed to individual, the discipline imposed was less severe.

All of the more serious violations led to significantly more severe discipline. EXCESS RULES, INSUBORD, ALCOHOL, GAMBLING, THEFT, and GARNISHMENTS all were more severely punished than less serious offenses. Clearly, the hypothesized boundary between types of offenses exists. Immediate discharge for serious offenses (GAMBLING, THEFT, and GARNISHMENTS) is practiced.

There is an inconsistent assignment of severity over time and location, even accounting for employee value, union political effects, and the seriousness of the offense. Six of the nine years were related to significant differences in SEVERITY, from the base year, 1949. There are also significant differences between other comparisons of years. Also, discipline in the TRACTOR plant was less severe (bordering on accepted levels of significance) than that in the TRUCK plant.

CONCLUSIONS

This study makes initial empirical tests of propositions that have been part of the industrial relations literature for many years. Support is found that a grievant's work record and history affect the severity of discipline against him. A clean discipline record leads to less severe discipline. A longer discipline record leads to more severe discipline. Being verbally warned leads to more severe discipline. The level of skill and the seniority of the grievant are found to be not significantly related to the severity of the discipline. Variables measuring union political needs affect the severity of discipline. In this relationship, violations of more serious rules lead to significantly more severe discipline. The people at Ford-UAW Local 400 and Ford's management at the Highland Park plant complex took employee value, union political needs, and the seriousness of the offense into account in applying the disciplinary process. However, even accounting for these effects, large, significant inconsistencies were found in the practice of choosing the severity of the discipline.

Thus, it appears that the interactional justice process better describes the actual behavior of the parties in the grievance procedure, as opposed to procedural justice. The supervisors at Ford Motor Company were not consistent in their assignment of the severity
of discipline, even given the broad categories used in this study, even controlling for the
grievant and situational characteristics thought to impact that severity. Future research can
more directly test the extent of inconsistency existing in grievance procedures, and the
reasons for it by examining the causal accounts used to explain those inconsistencies in light
of the factors examined here.

Now that the initial empirical groundwork of practical just cause and due process has
been laid out, the reformatory impact of this system can be examined. Future researchers
can test the impact of discipline systems on employee commitment to reform and on the
punitive component of the discipline management imposes. Practitioners that heretofore
had no practical guidance as to what affects severity can find empirical support from Ford-
UAW Local 400 practice. The feedback called for by Knight (1986) is made available to
the parties for discipline and discharge cases. In resolving these cases, the parties need to
weigh employee value, union political needs, and, most importantly, the seriousness of the
offense in resolving the case.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX TABLE 1

ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF GRIEVANT VALUE, SERIOUSNESS OF OFFENSE, AND POLITICAL EFFECTS (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)

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<td>GARNISHMENTS</td>
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<th>Variable</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \mu(1) )</td>
<td>+.822***</td>
<td>(.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \mu(2) )</td>
<td>+1.186***</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\[ \mu(3) + 1.452^{***} \]
\[ (.144) \]

-2X LOG LIKELIHOOD  609.10

\[ X^2 \ 206.00^{***} \text{28 d.f.} \]

N  310

\[ R^2 (\text{from multiple regression}) .502 \]

* significant at \( \geq .10 \) level, one-tailed test
* significant at \( \geq .10 \) level, two-tailed test
** significant at \( \geq .05 \) level, two-tailed test
*** significant at \( \geq .001 \) level, two-tailed test

i. Examples of these include: Henry, 1989; Kaplan, 1989; Klaas, 1989a; Klaas and Wheeler, 1990; Markowich, 1989; McPherson, 1987; Murphy, Barlow, and Hatch, 1989; Payne and Smith, 1989; and Tompkins, 1989, from the industrial relations literature and Bies, 1987a,b; Bies and Moag, 1986; Folger and Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg, 1987a,b,c, 1988, 1990; Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry, 1980; Sheppard, 1984, 1985; and Tyler, 1989, from the organizational behavior/psychology literature.

ii. For examples of the many 'how to' papers see the above and Haddock, 1989; and Layne, 1989.


v. The variables left for the constant term are 1949, NEGLIGENCE, and the TRUCK plant.